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FROM: Moscow

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 926, October 7, 5 p.m.

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:: convinced by his talks
with Khrushchev that latter operating on basis deep personal
hatred of President Eisenhower. I am convinced this untrue.
Khrushchev was in fact personally embarrassed in USSR and bloc
by our handling of U-2 affair in view his personal commitment
to "spirit Camp David" and he has shown lack of respect for
President's role in field of foreign affairs. Nevertheless
from my conversations with him both before and after U-2 incident
including our last conversation, I am convinced he was greatly
impressed by President's personality and on purely personal
basis has warm feeling toward him. In any event Soviet leaders
are not type to let personal feelings affect high policy decisions.
Therefore believe we must look elsewhere for reasons Soviets
decided at time Paris Summit not to attempt negotiations with
present US administration. Among other following are possibilities:

Most obvious explanation is that Soviets realized final conclusion
of agreements on such questions as Berlin, Germany, and dis-
armament unlikely to be reached in first round of negotiations
and probably not before new elections. They would therefore
be at disadvantage in that they could not be sure that in
return for any concessions they offered in negotiations, new
administration would honor proposals put forward on US side.

Second possibility is that Soviets felt necessary to deal with
split in Communist camp brought about by Chinese party before
facing West in show-down negotiations.

Third and more sinister possibility is that Soviets have in
fact achieved major military-scientific break-through which they
wish develop in order be able negotiate from position of greater
strength.

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